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STUDENT NOT_,
that the debtor in accepting the money has -not lost his right to
sue and recover.' Under this view the employee m Tanner v.
Merrill should have been allowed to have the counter-claim decided
upon the evidence.
Another method frequently employed in avoiding the Tanner
v. Merrill rule is to find that the creditor did not clearly understand that the payment was made in full satisfaction of all claims. =
This view is scarcely convincing since most of the cases involve
checks marked payment in full, often adding, of all claims. The
least that can be said is that the courts are very liberal in finding
that the creditor was reasonable m failing to understand the terms
of the payment.
Even a casual reading of such cases leads to the belief that
many courts, including Kentucky, while supposedly following Tanner v. -Merrll,are quite willing, perhaps even eager, -to be convinced that a given set of facts can be differentiatea from'that case
and a contra result obtained. -It is suggested that'this is due to- a
conviction that the principal case rests on a doubtful legal basis
and is equally questionable from the point of view of attaining
'justice.
ROSAiWNA A. BLAKE

WHEN DOES PREPARATION FOR CRIME BECOME
A CRIMINAL ATTEMPT?
The law of criminal attempts presents two principal problems.
One of these is the effect of impossibility, and the other involves
determining when preparation for a crime becomes a criminal
attempt. It has been suggested that impossibility is no bar to
making out the crime if the defendant reasonably -expected -to
succeed with the means he was usmg.
If the defenaant' could
not have reasonably expected to succeed, thenk the necessary
specific intent cannot be shown, and thus the- crime cannot be made
out. Impossibility, in this view, is important only -for its bearing upon specific intent. In this paper the - theory will be advanced that preparation becomes a crime when the preparatory
acts are of such an unequivocal nature that a criminal design
is manifest.
In the cases to be cited subsequently, the language
is to the effect that while the act need not be the last proximate
step before consumation, yet it must be beyond mere preparation;
it-must be an act directly tending toward commission of the crime.
Tha effect of holding that an act of preparation is too remote from
'Fairfield v. Corbett Hardware Co., 25 Ariz. 199, 215 Pac. 510
(1923), Robinson v. Leatherbee Tie and Lumber Co., 120 Ga. 901,
48 S.E. 380 (1904), Perlitch v. Kanner, 171 N.Y.S. 148 (1918).
109 Ky.388, 59 S.W 323 (1900)
"Note (1943) 31 Ky.L. J. 270.
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the completed crime to constitute an attempt is that the unequivocal
nature of the intent cannot be shown.
An examination of the literature of crnnmal attempts and the
cases dealing with the subject reveals that no general rule can be
laid down which will be of very great help in determinng at
just what point preparation for a crime shades off into a punishable attempt. It will depend in part upon the nature of the crime
and how great is the danger of societal harm inherent therein, upon
the theory of punishment to which the court involved adheres, and
also upon the criminal record of the individual involved.
In attempts the mens rea required is an intent to commit the
complete crime which the accused is charged with attempting.
In this respect the ground of punishment for attempts differs
materially from that in other crimes. For example, in the crime
of murder, the condition for the infliction of punishment is the
corpus delicti, and the mens rea is a necessary condition, but in
attempts the law makes mens rea the more important ground and
the corpus delicti is the necessary condition.' In attempts the law
has come very close to making an exception to the rule that intent
alone is never a punishable offense. It is true that intent alone is
never sufficient to constitute the crime, but must always have
coupled with it a certain number of the elements that compose
the completed crime. On the other hand, an act alone can never
amount to an attempt, no matter how well adapted it may be
to effect a criminal result, unless coupled with intent. The man
who points a gun at his friend in jest, though it is loaded, is
guilty of no attemptf the same act when done with intent to
harm may at once become a punishable attempt. A boy and
girl are on an outing together; in a spirit of play he seeks to hold
her, and she breaks free and runs, he ui pursuit. No one would
pretend that such conduct is criminal on the part of the boy. The
very same facts, with an evil intent infused, might well constitute
an attempt to rape. Clearly, then, when a person is held guilty
of an attempt, the court is saying, in effect, a person whose acts
manifest such a dangerous ntendment is a menace to society and
ought to be subjected to penalty to protect society against his
depredations.
'The difficulty of formulating a helpful general rule is recognized by Arnold, who says: "An effort to state a single general
rule for attempts to commit all crimes flies in the face of the fact
that the people through their judges and juries intend to and do
find criminal liability at points of greater or less remoteness-to the
contemplated crime according to the nature of the particular crime
and the personality of the actors in it." Arnold, Crnmznul Attempts
-The Rise and Fall of An Abstraction (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 53.
'CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) §115; MAY, CRnWxNAL LAW (4th ed. 1938) 190.
'Turner, Attempts to Commit Crzmes (1934) 5 Camb. L. T.
230, 235.
rcf. Note (1942) 30 Ky L. J. 421.
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When is an attempt to commit a specific crime complete?
Turner advances the following rule in answer to this question:
"The actus reus of an attempt to commit a specific crime is constituted when the accused person does an act which is a step towards
the commission of that specific crime, and the doing of such act
can have no other purpose than the commssion of that specific
crime."
An act which does not contribute to the comminssion of
the crime, though it may indicate mens Yea, cannot count as part
of the actus reus. For example, A writes to his good friend B
and states his intent to murder X.
This may indicate intent to
commit a crime on the part of A, but it would not be sufficient
to constitute a punishable attempt. The language of the cases
usually is a paraphrase of the following statement:
"The accused must take at least one step beyond preparation,
by doing something directly moving toward and bringing him
nearer the crime he intends tb commit. In other words, while
the act need not be the last proximate act to the consummation
of the offense attempted to be perpetrated, it must be such as
will apparently result, in the usual and natural course of events, if
not hindered by extraneous causes, in the commission of the
crime itself!"
A keeps a jewelry shop, and before leaving for the night,
he takes a number of valuable diamonds from the safe and caches
them beneath the safe with the intention of reporting them stolen
and collecting the insurance
Before he has had an opportunity
to report them stolen and file a claim, his plan is frustrated.
Though his actions may have shown an intent to commit the crime,
yet until he has made some move toward obtaining the insurance
money, his acts would not constitute an attempt. While his act
in concealing the jewels might indicate d criminal purpose, nevertheless it was not unequvocally indicated. To state the matter
differently, intent was indicated, but not unequivocally indicated.
He might have been merely turning the crnminal design over in
his mind and debating it, and might voluntarily have desisted
short of that point where intent has crystallized into a dynamic
effecting of purpose. Society is endangered sufficiently for the
law to notice only when intent has crystallized into dynamic
form.
At what point in the process of preparation does a criminal
attempt become complete? The language in the following cases,
selected at random, indicates that the rule used to determine
when preparation for crime has ripened into a crnnmal attempt
stands either upon the vague concept of proximity to or remoteness from the crime attempted, or whether the acts directly tended
toward commission of the offense. The rule as thus defined is
6Turner, supra at 236. (Italics omitted)
716
C. J. 114.
8
Regma v. Robinson, 11 Cr. App. R. 124 (1915).
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so inde'finite that it has alinost no value, and the task of reconciling the, cases under the rule is a hopeless undertaking. In the
cases cited, if one looks behind the language, it will be seen that
the courts found the crime to be complete when the defendant's
preparatory acts were so unequivocal that the specific intent to
commit the crime could be inferred beyond reasonable doubt. A
consideration of a -few cases reveals that the answer to the above
question depends upon the crime attempted and the circumstances
in the particular case. The line of demarcation between mere
preparation and, the attempt; the courts customarily say, in effect,
is marked by that overt act which is of such nature as will
apparently result, in the usual and natural course of events, if
not hindered by extraneous causes, in the commission of the crime
itself.
In People v. Miller,- a conviction for attempted murder was
reversed where the defendant approached his alleged victim carrying a rifle but did not point or aim the gun, and the victim fled,
keeping a distance between himself and the defendant until the
latter was disarmed. From this and other cases involving attempted
hormcide it would seem that the requirements of this type of
attempts are satisfied, at the earliest, when the defendant starts
to aim the gun at the victim. Acts short of that stage are so
equivocal that the necessary intent cannot be inferred.
In People v. Lanzit,li a conviction was sustained where the
defendant arranged to have a bomb made to kill his estranged
wife. In this instance, the defendant procured another to construct the lethal weapon and accompanied him the the place
where his wife was to be at a later hour. The defendant struck
several matches to assist the confederate in placing the detonator,
and the court relied upon these acts as being near enough to the
crime itself to render the accused guilty Police made the arrest
before there was opportunity for the bomb to explode. Perhaps
it may be said that here the preparation merges into the attempt
'2 Cal. (2d) 527, 42 P (2d) 308, 98 A. L. R. 913 (1935).
Accord, Ex parte Turnerj 3 Okla. Cr. 168, 104 Pac. 1071 (1909);
cf. Lee v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 594, 131 S. E. 212 (1926).
1-70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 816 (1925). But cf. State v. Davis,
319 Mo. 1222, 6 S. W. (2d) 609 (1928) where.the defendant had an
affair with a woman, and they planned to kill her husband. Defendant contacted L who was to procure a killer, but instead
divulged the plan to a policeman, who posed as the killer. Defendant, unaware that his plan had been disclosed to an officer instead
of the one intended, planned the manner and place of the slaying,
providing the. defendant with a picture of the proposed victim, and
a plan of the place where the victim was to be slam. Money was
paid to the officer, and the latter went to the scene of the proposed
crime in strict accordance with the plans made by- the defendant.
Held, no attempt. This illustrates the absurd result obtained by
adherence to the rule that the act of the accused must be, in the
words often used, one step beyond mere preparation.
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when the bomb is placed on the intended premises, or, the defendant, bearing the bomb, arrives at the place where he is to place it.
In Lewts v. State,' a negro accosted a white woman with intent
to commit rape. The woman fled, and the negro pursued her for
a distance of a mile or more, before she eluded him. At no time
did he get closer than ten steps. The court held that if he went
so far as to put her in terror and make flight necessary it was
sufficient. Thus, in the case of rape, an attempt may be complete
where the victim's person has not been touched.
For a less. serious crime, adultery may be considered. In State v.
Schwarzbach,' the woman's husband was presumed to be away
for the night, but returned unexpectedly to find the defendant in
his wife's bedroom. She was sitting upon the bed clad in a
nightgown, and the defendant was standing nearby, his hat, coat,
and shoes removed, and one suspender strap hanging down, as
though preparatory to removing his other garments. The defendant was held guilty of attempted adultery. =
In a sense, intent is the essence of the crime of attempts, but the
act which would clearly point toward intent where the crime has
been consummated, may be eqivocal, and insufficient to prove the
species of intent requisite to an attempt. For example, in People
v. Miller," the defendant, to consummate an attempt, had but to
point the gun at the alleged victim, and yet the court held that
there was no attempt. In People v. Lanzit," consummation was
made impossible; the intended victim was not present and the
defendant's confederate had no intention of allowing the crime to
be perpetrated, yet the attempt was held to be complete.
The
usual rule of proximity to or remoteness from the crime cannot
reconcile these cases. They can be reconciled, however, under
a rule that holds the attempt to be complete when the defendant's
acts are so unequivocal as to show the intent to commit the whole
crime. In the former case the defendant's acts were not inconsistent
with a purpose no more blameworthy than to frighten or intimdate. In the latter case the defendant's acts were consistent only
with an intent to execute the crime of murder.
8a35Ala. 380 (1860). Accord, Burton v State, 8 Ala. App. 295,
62 So. 394 (1913), People v. Stewart, 87 Cal. 238, 32 Pac. 8 (1893)
,84 N. J. L. 268, 86 At. 423 (1913)
" The court said in part, "Preparation for adultery necessarily
consists of such preliminary arrangements as appointing the time
and place of meeting, and repairing to the rendezvous; but, after
the parties are met and are disrobed or disrobing, and nothing but
an extraneous cause, namely, one not moving from themselves,
prevents the accomplishment of the intended crinmnal purpose, thep
surely the offenders have progressed beyond the stage of preparation and are actually engaged in the attempted commission of
crime."
"2 Cal. (2d) 527, 42 P (2d) 308 (1935) supra note 9.
"70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 816 (1925) supra note 10.
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A hypothetical case with the constituent elements of a typical
crime set forth might be helpful in indicating where the line is
to be drawn. A and B are next-door neighbors and bitter enemies.
A is sitting in his living room reading the evening paper and
brooding over the grudge he bears his neighbor. He decides to kill
B, but he has no gun in the house, and no place is open where he
can buy a gun at that hour. Next morning A goes down town
and purchases a gun and cartridges, putting both in his pocket.
Both intent and the means of executing that intent are now present,
but his acts do not yet constitute an attempt. When evening has
come, and B is out upon his lawn, A goes out upon his own lawn,
his hand grasping the gun concealed in his pocket. Probably no
attempt could yet be made out. A takes the gun from the pocket
of his coat and points it at B-at this point the attempt is complete. In this case A's intent was fully formed while he sat
brooding over his grudge, and even at this point he was a menace
to society. The law, however, will take no action until his intent
has crystallized into dynamic manifestation.
It is submitted that the better rule-the rule wich is latent in
the cases cited-is that preparation for a crime becomes a crime
when the acts of the defendant are so unequivocal in nature that
the defendant's intent to commit the crime is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Under this rule, proximity to the crime itself would
not be the decisive factor except to the extent that proximity would
bear upon the question of intent. This rule would permit a greater
flexibility of administration, and this, in turn, would enable courts
and juries more effectively to guard against socially dangerous
individuals.
LEo OxLzEy

IS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF IMPRISONMENT
BY THE PLAINTIFF A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN
FALSE IMPRISONMENT?
"False imprisonment has been said to be the unlawful restraint
by one person of the physical liberty of another."'
Prosser says
that it is an invasion of an interest, which is in a sense mental,
resembling the apprehension of contact in the assault cases. Therefore, if one incloses another within definitive bounds without just
cause and without the consent of the other, he is liable for false
im risonment.
It is contended'by the text-writers that the better view is that
the plaintiff must have actual knowledge, at the time, of the
fact that he as imprisoned before he can maintain an action.3
122 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, sec. 2.
"PRossER,TORTS (1941) 68.
'Ibid.

